A role hierarchy defines permission acquisition and role-activation semantics through role-role relationships. It can be utilized for efficiently and effectively structuring functional roles of an organization having related access-control needs. The focus of this paper is the analysis of hybrid role hierarchies in the context of the generalized temporal role-based access control (GTRBAC) model that allows specification of a comprehensive set of temporal constraints on role, user-role, and rolepermission assignments. We introduce the notion of uniquely activable set (UAS) associated with a role hierarchy that indicates the access capabilities of a user resulting from his membership to a role in the hierarchy. Identifying such a role set is essential, while making an authorization decision about whether or not a user should be allowed to activate a particular combination of roles in a single session. We formally show how UAS can be determined for a hybrid hierarchy. Furthermore, within a hybrid hierarchy, various hierarchical relations may be derived between an arbitrary pair of roles. We present a set of inference rules that can be used to generate all the possible derived relations that can be inferred from a specified set of hierarchical relations and show that it is sound and complete. We also present an analysis of hierarchy transformations with respect to role addition, deletion, and partitioning, and show how various cases of these transformations allow the original permission acquisition and role-activation semantics to be managed. The formal results presented here provide a basis for developing efficient security administration and management tools.
INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) has emerged as a promising alternative to traditional discretionary and mandatory access-control (DAC and MAC) models, which have inherent limitations [Giuri 1995 [Giuri , 1996 Joshi et al. 2001a; Nyanchama and Osborn 1999; Osborn et al. 2000; Sandhu et al. 1996; Koch et al. 2002] . Several beneficial features, such as policy neutrality, support for least privilege and efficient access, control management are associated with RBAC models [Ferraiolo et al. 1993; Joshi et al. 2001b; Sandhu et al. 1996] . Such features make RBAC better suited for handling access-control requirements of diverse organizations. RBAC models have also been found suitable for addressing security issues in the Internet environment [Barkley et al. 1997; Joshi et al. 2001a; Park et al. 2001] and show promise for newer heterogeneous multidomain environments that raise serious concerns related to access control across multiple domains [Biskup et al. 1998; Joshi et al. 2001b ].
An essential part of an RBAC model is the notion of a role hierarchy. Role hierarchies play a crucial role in authorization management and administration [Moffett 1998; Sandhu et al. 1996 Sandhu et al. , 1998 Jaeger and Tidswell 2001] and in the succinct RBAC representations of DAC and MAC policies [Osborn et al. 2000] . When two roles are hierarchically related, one is called the senior and the other the junior. In the most commonly accepted RBAC96 family of models ], a senior and its junior roles are related by an inheritance relation that has two semantic parts: permission-inheritance (also called permissionusage [Sandhu 1998 ]) and role-activation semantics. Permission-inheritance semantics allows a senior role to inherit all the permissions assigned to its junior roles, whereas the role-activation semantics allows all the users assigned to a senior role to activate its junior roles. The RBAC96 models use the combined hierarchy semantics that allows both the permission-inheritance and the role-activation semantics. This significantly reduces assignment overhead, as the permissions need only be assigned to junior roles [Sandhu 1998; Moffett 1998 ]. Sandhu showed that, under the combined hierarchy semantics, certain separation-of-duty (SoD) constraints cannot be defined on hierarchically related roles, thus, restricting its effectiveness in supporting a broader set of fine-grained constraints and, in particular, in representing MAC policies [Sandhu 1998 ]. To address such shortcomings of RBAC96, Sandhu has proposed the ER-RBAC96 model that incorporates a distinction between a usage hierarchy that applies only the permission-inheritance semantics and an activation hierarchy that uses the combined hierarchy semantics [Sandhu 1998 ]. Later, Joshi et al. have established a clear distinction between the three role hierarchies: permission-inheritance-only hierarchy (I hierarchy), activation-only hierarchy (A-hierarchy), and the combined permission-inheritance and activation hierarchy (IA-hierarchy) [Joshi et al. 2002] . The need for different semantics for hierarchical relations has also been recognized by Moffet et al. in Moffett [1998] and Moffett and Lupu [1999] . In particular, they have identified the need for three types of organizational hierarchies: is a, activity, and supervision, in order to address the needs of control principles in an organization, such as SoD, decentralization of control and supervision and review. Use of a combined hierarchy semantics has been found to limit a hierarchy in achieving these organizational control goals and, hence, to address such control requirements, it is desirable to configure a hybrid role hierarchy that allows different hierarchical relations among roles [Joshi et al. 2002] . Such a hybrid hierarchy is provided as part of the recently proposed generalized temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) model and it is able to support a variety of combinations of inheritance and activation semantics [Joshi et al. 2005b] .
Another relevant functionality in access control is that of time-constraining accesses to resources for controlling time-sensitive activities in an application, for instance, in a workflow management system (WFMS) [Bertino and Ferrari 1999] , where various workflow tasks, each having some timing constraints, need to be executed in some order. Bertino et al.'s temporal RBAC model (TRBAC) provided the first framework for modeling time-constrained access policies [Bertino et al. 2001 ]. The GTRBAC model extends the TRBAC model and incorporates a set of language constructs for specifying a large set of periodicity and duration constraints, including those on role enabling, userrole and role-permission assignments, and role activations. An important issue in the GTRBAC model is the interplay between the temporal constraints and role hierarchies, which has been first addressed in Joshi et al. [2002] . Accordingly, Joshi et al. identify various subtypes of the I, A, and IA hierarchies that capture temporal semantics of a hierarchy in presence of temporal constraints on roles. In the presence of a hybrid hierarchy containing multiple hierarchy types, a user may be able to activate different sets of junior roles in a session. Sets of roles that can be activated or permissions that can be acquired by a user at a particular time indicate the overall access capabilities of the user. From the perspective of the principle of least privilege, it may be necessary to ensure that such activable sets of roles do not result in granting users unnecessary access capabilities. Determining such sets can become very complex in the presence of a hybrid hierarchy. Furthermore, it is essential to know what indirect relations may exist between roles that are not directly related so that when modifications are made to the hierarchy, original relations can be maintained, if at all possible. For example, consider the relatively simple hybrid hierarchy of Figure 1 . Here, determining the sets of roles that can be activated in a single session by a user assigned only to role r 3 is not straightforward. Similarly, when we delete the role s 1 , we need to make sure that the original relations between r 3 and t 1 , r 3 and s 2 , or r 3 and x 1 are retained.
Flexible models, like GTRBAC, need formal tools for an efficient security administration and management. In this paper, we present a formal basis for analyzing hybrid hierarchies in GTRBAC. The contributions of this paper include the following:
r We define the notion of uniquely activable set (UAS) of a hierarchy that can be used by security administrators for determining access capabilities that a user can obtain from a role hierarchy in a single session. We show formally how such a set can be determined in a hybrid role hierarchy. r We introduce a set of inference rules that allows inferring the hierarchical relationships between an arbitrary pair of roles that are not directly related and show that it is sound and complete. r We develop a set of hierarchy transformation algorithms to assist in administering role hierarchies when the roles are added, deleted, or modified.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of the GTRBAC model. In Section 3, we introduce the three basic hierarchical relations that can exist on a set of roles followed by their subtypes. In Section 4, we introduce the notion of UAS and present a formal technique for characterizing it. In Section 5, we introduce a set of inference rules for inferring derived hierarchical relation between an arbitrary pair of roles. In Section 6, we introduce hierarchy transformation algorithms. Related work is discussed in Section 7. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 8. The proofs for the theorems presented in this paper are available in the techical report version of the paper with the same title at https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/.
GENERALIZED TEMPORAL ACCESS CONTROL MODEL (GTRBAC)
The GTRBAC model introduces the separate notion of role enabling and role activation, and provides constraints and event expressions associated with both. An enabled role indicates that a valid user can activate it, whereas an activated role indicates that at least one user has activated it. The GTRBAC model allows the specification of the following set of constraints:
1. Temporal constraints on role enabling/disabling: These constraints allow the specification of intervals and durations in which a role is enabled. When a role is enabled, the permissions assigned to it can be acquired by a user by activating it. When a duration constraint is specified, the enabling/disabling of a role is initiated by a constraint-enabling event that results from the firing of a trigger or through an administrator-initiated run-time event. 2. Temporal constraints on user-role and role-permission assignments: These constraints allow specifying intervals and durations in which a user or a permission is assigned to a role. 3. Activation constraints: These constraints allow specification of restrictions on the activation of a role. These include, for example, specifying the total duration for which a user may activate a role or the number of concurrent activations of a role at a particular time. 4. Run-time events: A set of run-time events allows an administrator to dynamically initiate GTRBAC events or enable duration or activation constraints. Another set of run-time events allow users to request activation or deactivation of a role. 5. Constraint-enabling expressions: The GTRBAC model includes events that enable or disable duration and role-activation constraints mentioned earlier. 6. Triggers: The GTRBAC triggers allow expressing dependencies among events. Table I summarizes the constraint types and expressions of the GTRBAC model. The periodic expression used in the constraint expressions is of the form (I, P), where P is an expression denoting an infinite set of periodic intervals and I = [begin, end] is a time interval denoting the lower and upper bounds that are imposed on instants in P. The function SoI (I, P ) is used to denote all the time instants in (I, P). D expresses the duration specified for a constraint. In the duration and role-activation constraint expressions, D x and N x indicate the duration and cardinality values. If the subscript x starts with u, then it is a per-user-role constraint otherwise it is a per-role constraint. For instance, D active indicates the duration for which the specified role can be active, whereas, D uactive indicates the duration for which the specified user may activate the specified role. The following example illustrates the specification of a GTRBAC policy. For more details on the GTRBAC model, we refer the readers to Joshi et al. [2005b] .
Example 2.1. 
Run-time requests
Users' activation request (s : (de)activate r for u after t)) ( pr :assign U /de-assign U r to u after t) Administrator's run-time ( pr :enable/disable r after t) request ( pr :assign P /de-assign P p to r after t) ( pr :enable/disable c after t) the assignment in 1c allows Carol to assume the DayDoctor role everyday between 10 AM and 3 PM. In 2a, Ami and Elizabeth are assigned to roles NurseInTraining and DayNurse respectively, with no temporal restriction, i.e., the assignment is valid at all times. 2b specifies a duration constraint of 2 hr on the enabling time of the NurseInTraining role, but this constraint is valid for only 6 hr after the constraint c 1 has been enabled. Because of this, Ami will be able to activate the NurseInTraining role, at most, for 2 hr whenever constraint c 1 is enabled. In row 3, we have a set of triggers. Trigger 3a indicates that (r, t) Role r is enabled at time t u assigned (u, r, t) User u is assigned to role r at time t p assigned ( p, r, t) Permission p is assigned to role r at time t can activate (u, r, t) User u can activate role r at time t can acquire (u, p, t) User u can acquire permission p at time t can be acquired ( p, r, t) Permission p can be acquired through role r at time t active (u, r, s, t) Role r is active in user u's session s at time t acquires (u, p, s, t) User u acquires permission p in session s at time t constraint c 1 is enabled when the DayNurse is enabled, which means, now, the NurseInTraining role, can be enabled for, at most, 2 hr within the next 6 hr (Note that after the next 6 hr, the NurseInTraining role can be enabled for any duration of time). Trigger 3b indicates that 10 min after Elizabeth activates the DayNurse role, the NurseInTraining role is enabled. This shows that a nurse in training will have access to the system only if Elizabeth is present in the system, that is, she may be acting as a training supervisor. The remaining triggers in row 3 show that the DayNurse and NightNurse roles are enabled (disabled) 10 min after the DayDoctor and NightDoctor roles are enabled (disabled).
HYBRID ROLE HIERARCHIES
In an earlier work, we have introduced the following three hierarchy types, mentioned earlier: permission-inheritance-only hierarchy (I hierarchy), role-activation-only hierarchy (A-hierarchy), and the combined permissioninheritance-activation hierarchy (IA-hierarchy) [Joshi et al. 2002] . Table III shows the notation for various predicates used in the definitions of these hierarchies. Predicates enabled (r, t), assigned(u, r, t) and assigned (p, r, t) refer to the status of roles, user-role and role-permission assignments at time t. Predicate can activate (u, r, t) indicates that user u can activate role r at time t. This implies that user u is implicitly or explicitly assigned to role r. active (u, r, s, t) indicates that role r is active in user u's session s at time t whereas, acquires (u, p, s, t) implies that u acquires permission p at time t in session s. The axioms below capture the key relationships among these predicates and precisely identify the permission-acquisition and role-activation semantics allowed in the GTRBAC model [Joshi et al. 2002] .
AXIOMS. If r ∈ Roles, u ∈ Users, p ∈ Permissions, s ∈ Sessions, and time instant t ≥ 0, the following implications hold: ( p, r, t) 2. u assigned (u, r, t) → can activate(u, r, t) 3. can activate (u, r, t) ∧ can be acquired ( p, r, t) → can acquire (u, p, t) 4. active (u, r, s, t) ∧ can be acquired ( p, r, t) → acquires(u, p, s, t) Axiom (1) states that if a permission is assigned to a role, then it can be acquired through that role. Axiom (2) states that all users assigned to a role can activate that role. Axiom (3) states that if a user u can activate a role r, then all the permissions that can be acquired through r can be acquired by u. Similarly, axiom (4) states that if there is a user session in which a user u has activated a role r then u acquires all the permissions that can be acquired through role r. We note that axioms (1) and (2) indicate that the semantics for the permission-acquisition and role-activation is governed by explicit user-role and role-permission assignments.
Formal Definitions of Temporal Role Hierarchies
Semantically, the use of a role hierarchy is to extend the possibility of permission-acquisition and role-activation semantics beyond the explicit assignments as indicated by the definitions below [Joshi et al. 2002] . The GTRBAC model's constraint enabling/disabling expressions can be used to specify when a hierarchical relation can be enabled/disabled. Hence, if h is a hierarchical relation, we write "enable/disable h" to enable/disable the relation. This allows administrators to dynamically change, if needed, the hierarchical relationships on a set of roles through periodicity or duration constraints, run-time requests and triggers. The following definitions do not consider the enabling times of the hierarchically related roles and, hence, the hierarchies are termed unrestricted.
Definition 3.1 (Unrestricted I-Hierarchy [Joshi et al. 2002]) . Let x and y be roles such that (x ≥ i y), that is, x has a permission inheritance-only relation over y at time t. Then the following holds:
Definition 3.2 (Unrestricted A-Hierarchy [Joshi et al. 2002]) . Let x and y be roles such that (x ≥ a y), that is, x has an activation-only relation over y at time t. Then the following holds: ∀u, (x ≥ a y) ∧ can activate (u, x, t) → can activate (u, y, t) ( c 2 ) IA-Hierarchy) . Let x and y be roles such that (x ≥ y), that is, x has a general inheritance relation over y at time t. Then the following holds:
In the definitions above, x is said to be a senior of y and, conversely, y is said to be a junior of x. Thus, if (x ≥ i y), the permissions that can be acquired through x, include all the permissions assigned to x (by axiom (1)) and all the permissions that can be acquired through role y (by c 1 ). Condition c 2 states that if user u can activate role x, and x has A-relation over y, then u can also activate role y, even if u is not explicitly assigned to y. The IA-hierarchy is the most common form of hierarchy. On a given set of roles, various inheritance relations may be defined. Therefore, we require that the following consistency property be satisfied in a role hierarchy in order to ensure that the seniorjunior relationship between two roles in one type of hierarchy is not reversed in another. Note that all three hierarchies are transitive. In what follows, we will always assume that hierarchies are consistent. When we consider the enabling times of hierarchically related roles, we obtain weakly restricted and strongly restricted forms of the hierarchies. Their semantics is exemplified in Figure 2 , in which roles-Software Engineer and Programmerare hierarchically related. Of those two roles, only one is enabled in intervals τ 1 and τ 2 . In a strongly restricted hierarchy, inheritance is not allowed in these intervals. This is because, in this type of hierarchy, both roles must be enabled for inheritance to take place. By contrast, in a weakly restricted hierarchy, inheritance may be allowed in these intervals. Table IV shows the inheritance properties of weakly restricted and strongly restricted hierarchies in τ 1 and τ 2 , when r 1 is senior of r 2 .
When activation-time restrictions are to be enforced in GTRBAC, different hierarchy types may need to be considered depending upon whether the constraint is user-or permission-centric [Joshi et al. 2002] . An activation constraint is user-centric if it is designed to control different aspects of users in the system through role activations, for example, to control the number of users activating a role. An activation constraint is permission-centric if it is aimed at controlling distribution of the permissions through role activations that an I or IA-hierarchy is appropriate when an activation constraint is user-centric, whereas an A-hierarchy is appropriate when the activation constraint is permission-centric.
Examples of Temporal Role Hierarchies
We illustrate with the examples 3.1 and 3.2 that refers to Figure 3 the practical uses of the various kinds of hierarchies.
Example 3.1. Consider the hierarchy in Figure 3 (a). Here, we see that the SeniorSecurityAdmin role is enabled only in interval (8 PM, 11 PM). Neither of its junior roles is enabled in the entire interval (8 PM, 11 PM). The I w relation allows a user who activates the SeniorSecurityAdmin role to acquire all the permissions of its junior roles. This may be desirable if SeniorSecurityAdmin role is designed to perform special security operations for checking and maintenance. In such a case, it is reasonable to think that the user assigned to the SeniorSecurityAdmin role will need all the administrative privileges of the junior roles. The temporal restrictions on SecurityAdmin1 and SecurityAdmin2 constrain the users assigned to them to carry out corresponding system administration activities only in the specified intervals. However, here, the user assigned to SeniorSecurityAdmin cannot assume the role of the junior roles SecurityAdmin1 and SecurityAdmin2. To remove this limitation, we can use the I A w hierarchy instead. The hierarchy in Figure 3b , on the other hand, is of type I. The senior role is the PartTimeDoctor role, which has two intervals in which it can be enabled, (3 PM, 6 PM) and (7 AM, 10 AM). If a user activates the PartTimeDoctor role in the first interval, according to the I s relation, he essentially gets all the privileges of the DayDoctor role, as the NightDoctor role is disabled at that time. Now, consider the second interval. We see that it overlaps with the enabling times of the two junior roles. Hence, if the user activates the PartTimeDoctor role in the second interval, he acquires the privileges of only the NightDoctor role in the subinterval (7 AM, 9 AM) and that of only the DayDoctor role in the subinterval (9 AM, 10 AM). Thus, we see that the two different semantics of an inheritance hierarchy can be used to achieve different needs. Again, a part-time doctor cannot work as a DayDoctor or a NightDoctor, although he can acquire the permissions assigned to them. If a user is also to be allowed to use the junior roles, we can use I A s hierarchy instead. Now, consider Figure 3c . Here we see that there is no interval in which the GeneralDoctor role can be enabled. However, since the activation hierarchy is of type A w , any user assigned to the GeneralDoctor role can activate either of the junior roles when they are enabled. In effect, any user assigned to the GeneralDoctor role can activate both the DayDoctor and the NightDoctor roles whenever they are enabled. Figure 3d illustrates the use of an activation hierarchy of type A s . Here, a supervising doctor can assume the SupervisorDoctor role in intervals (10 AM, 12 noon) and (7 AM, 9 AM). In the first interval, the supervisor will be able to acquire all the privileges of the DayDoctor role by activating it in the second interval, he will be able to acquire all the privileges of the NightDoctor role by activating it along with the SupervisorDoctor role. The SupervisorDoctor role may simply contain some extra privileges that are required for the supervision task during daytime or nighttime has identified such a supervision-review capability as an important organizational control principle.
Example 3.2. Consider the following requirements for a programming project. A software tool is used for the programming task. The project leader mainly supervises the programming tasks. Only the programmers do the coding. The project leader can only look at the tasks the programmers have carried out on a weekly basis, say on Fridays. Figure 3e depicts the hierarchy that can be generated for achieving the goal. Role TaskR contains the read-only permissions whereas role TaskW contains all the write/modify permissions related to the programming task. The Project Leader role becomes the senior of Programmer role only on Fridays. Note that the users assigned to the Project Leader can acquire permissions of TaskR but not of TaskW.
UNIQUELY ACTIVABLE SET OF A HIERARCHY
In this section, we introduce the notion of UAS and present a formal approach for characterizing it for a hierarchy. The UAS associated with a role in a hierarchy is essentially the set of role sets that can be activated by a user assigned only to that role. In a hierarchy that allows coexistence of the multiple hierarchy types, the permission-inheritance and role-activation semantics can be complex, thus making administration and management of large hierarchies difficult. The UAS gives the role combinations that can be activated by a user in a single session and thus helps in determining the granularity of permission sets that can be acquired by users through a role in the hierarchy. Thus, UAS is mainly relevant from the perspective of the principle of least privilege. Here, we first determine the UAS characteristics of a monotype hierarchy with only one type of hierarchical relation over the roles, followed by that of a hybrid linear path and then formalize results for the more general role hierarchy. The approach to determining the UAS presented in this section is algorithmic in nature. A mathematical (declarative) way of establishing the UAS is presented in Appendix C. We then introduce the notion of acquisition equivalence to characterize equivalent hierarchies in order to address the usefulness of a hybrid hierarchy. Here onward we will only use the unrestricted forms of hierarchies.
Computing Uniquely Activable Set of a Hierarchy
We represent by ( H) the UAS associated with a user assigned to the seniormost role of a hierarchy H. For a given role set X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n } and a set of
is a singleton set with hierarchy relation f , then we call H a monotype hierarchy and write (X, f ), else we call H a hybrid hierarchy. Furthermore, H is a linear path over X if (X, [f ] ) is an ordered sequence of
We represent a monotype linear path as L = (X, f ) and a hybrid linear path as
In this paper, we assume that (a) the set of permissions assigned to each role in Roles(H) is distinct, and (b) hierarchy H has only one senior-most role, indicated by S H .
The results can be easily extended to deal with a general hierarchy. We use J H to denote the set of junior-most roles of H. We use notation P(r) to refer to the set of permissions that are available through r (P (r) = {p|can be acquired(r, p)}). Similarly, given a set X of roles, we use P(X) to denote r∈X P (r). We formally define the UAS of a hierarchy as follows. 
where |A| denotes the cardinality of set A).
Note that each element Y i is a subset of X. Condition (2) indicates that each role set of (H) is unique in terms of the permissions that are available through its roles. Condition (3) considers the possibility of different role sets associated with the same set of permissions. In such a case, (H) contains the role set that has the least number of roles. Conditions (2) and (3) prevent a pair of senior and junior roles, e.g., of an IA-hierarchy, to be in a role set of (H). For instance, if relation (x≥ y) is in H, then the set {x} and not {x, y} will be in (H), as P (x) = P ({x, y}). The (H) values for I, A, and IA-hierarchy can differ significantly because of the difference in permission-inheritance and roleactivation semantics associated with them.
As a hybrid linear path may have different types of hierarchical relations, it can be decomposed into a set of monotype linear paths. The following definition formalizes the notion of monotype decomposition of a hybrid linear path (MDHP).
We denote the senior-and the junior-most roles of a hybrid linear path Lh as S Lh and J Lh , respectively. 
is a monotype linear path, and the following conditions hold:
It is easy to see that S Lh = S L 1 , and J Lh = J L n . As indicated by definition 4.2, we can break a hybrid linear path into an ordered set of monotype linear paths. Such an MDHP of a hybrid path allows us to use the UAS of the monotype linear paths to determine the UAS of a hybrid linear path. Note that the minimal MDHP consists of monotype linear paths that are maximal in the sense that combining any consecutive pair of component linear paths will give a component hybrid linear path, as indicated by part (1) of the definition. Example 4.1 illustrates the decomposition of a hybrid linear path into its monotype components. 
is not a MDHP, as L 4,1 and L 4,2 do not satisfy part (1) of definition 4.2.
In this paper, we also use functions sub L (LH) and sub U (LH) that return the lower and upper parts of a linear path LH. That is, if LH has
Here, sub L (LH) and sub U (LH) return the lower and the upper subpaths of
Because of the different activation semantics associated with each hierarchy type, UAS associated with each type is also different. The following theorem formally characterizes the UAS of a monotype hierarchy, H: THEOREM 4.1. Let H = (X, f ) be a monotype linear hierarchy defined over role set X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n } with f ∈ {≥ i , ≥ a , ≥}, then 
The theorem states that if H is an I hierarchy, (H) contains the senior-most role only. If H is an A-hierarchy, (H) contains the power set of the role set X without the empty element, i.e., the senior-most role can activate every combination of the roles in the hierarchy. Similarly, if H is an IA-hierarchy, (H) contains set elements containing individual roles of the hierarchy. The proof for the theorem follows directly from the transitive properties of the hierarchical relations and the permission-inheritance-only and/or role-activation-only semantics of the three hierarchies. The following example illustrates the use of the results of Theorem 4.1. However, GeneralDoctor is never enabled. If we do not consider temporal constraints, the UAS of hierarchy in Figure 3d is:
(H)= {{SupervisorDoctor}, {DayDoctor}, {NightDoctor}, {SupervisorDoctor,DayDoctor}, {SupervisorDoctor,NightDoctor}, {SupervisorDoctor,DayDoctor,NightDoctor}, {DayDoctor,}. {NightDoctor}}.
Next, we present a formal basis for characterizing (H) for a hybrid linear path. We first present the results for a hybrid linear path consisting of only two monotype linear components in the following lemma and then use it to characterize arbitrary hybrid linear paths.
Then for a user u assigned only to S L 1 , we have:
Note that in the computation involving (Lh), the components on the right side are disjoint with respect to each other and, hence, | (Lh)| is simply the sum of the cardinalities of the components on the right side. Theorem 4.2 determines the (H) for an arbitrary hybrid linear path.
, LH 2 is a linear path over X 2 , where X 1 and X 2 are role sets, and 
The next example illustrates the use of the above theorem and refers to Figure 5 . We note that to compute (H) for the hierarchy in case (c), we need to first compute for cases (a) and (b). Case a. Here L 1 has r 3 ≥ r 2 , and L 2 has r 2 ≥ a r 1 , i.e. ( f 1 , f 2 ) = (≥, ≥ a ). Therefore, by lemma 4.1, we have,
= {{r 2 }, {r 3 }} {{r 1 }} ({{r 2 }, {r 3 }} {{r 1 }}) = {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {{r 1 }, {r 2 }}, {r 1 , r 3 }} Case b. Here L 1 has r 5 ≥ a r 4 ≥ a r 3 , and LH 2 is the hierarchy in (b). Now, we apply Theorem 4.2. As f 1 = ≥ a , case (2) of the theorem applies. Thus,
(LH 2 ) = {{r 4 }, {r 5 }, {r 4 , r 5 }} {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }} ({{r 4 }, {r 5 }, {r 4 , r 5 }} {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }}) = {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }, {r 4 }, {r 5 }, {r 4 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 4 , r 5 }, {r 2 , r 4 }, {r 2 , r 5 }, {r 2 , r 4 , r 5 }, {r 3 , r 4 }, {r 3 , r 5 }, {r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }} Case c. Here L 1 = r 7 ≥ r 6 ≥ r 5 , and LH 2 is the hierarchy in (a). Again, we apply Theorem 4.2. Computation can be carried out similarly using:
= {{r 5 }, {r 6 }, {r 7 }} {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }, {r 4 }, {r 1 , r 4 }, {r 2 , r 4 }, {r 3 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }} ({{r 5 }, {r 6 }, {r 7 }} {{r 1 }, {r 2 }, {r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }, {r 4 }, {r 1 , r 4 }, {r 2 , r 4 }, {r 3 , r 4 },{r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }}) = {{r 5 }, {r 6 }, {r 7 }, {r 1 }, {r 2 },{r 3 }, {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 1 , r 3 }, {r 4 }, {r 1 , r 4 }, {r 2 , r 4 }, {r 3 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 }, {r 1 , r 5 }, {r 2 , r 5 }, {r 3 , r 5 }, {r 1 , r 2 , r 5 }, We note that each hierarchical structure can be broken down into a list of linear paths. We refer to such a decomposition of hierarchy as linear path decomposition of hybrid hierarchy (LPDHH). In the following, we consider a general hierarchy rooted at a role and represent it using a set of linear components in LPDHH.
Definition 4.4 (Linear Path Decomposition of Hybrid Hierarchy -LPDHH).
Let H = (X , [ f ]) be a hierarchy over role set X rooted at role S H with relation set [ f ] ⊆ {≥ i , ≥ a , ≥}. We say that H is an ordered set of linear paths (hybrid or monotype), that is, H = (LH 1 , LH 2 , . . ., LH m ), where LH i is a linear path over X i , if, for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . ., m}, i = j and LH i is a linear path over X i , and the following conditions hold Based on the notion of LPDHH of a general hybrid hierarchy, the following theorem shows how we can formally determine (H) of a general hybrid hierarchy that is not a simple linear path. Step 1: Consider components L 1 and Lh 2 .
Here, B = (L 1 ) (Lh 2 ) = {{r 3 }, {r 2 },{t 1 , r 2 }, {t 1 , r 3 }}. Therefore, (L 1 )\B (Lh 2 )\B = {{r 1 }} {{t 1 }} = {{r 1 , t 1 }}. Note that C is empty. Thus, (H 12 ) = I \ C = I = {{r 3 },{r 2 }, {r 1 }, {t 1 }, {r 1 , t 1 }, {r 3 , t 1 },{t 1 , r 2 }}.
Step 2 Based on the theorems, a recursive algorithm can be easily constructed.
Acquisition Equivalent Hierarchies
An important issue is whether or not we can use a hierarchy of one type to achieve what a hierarchy of another type allows. To address such an issue, we need an appropriate notion of equivalence between different hierarchies, as they may be structurally and semantically different. We note that, central to the use of hierarchies in a GTRBAC system is the efficient and fine-grained management of permissions acquired by users assigned to the various roles in the hierarchy. A notion of the equivalence between two hierarchies can be established if we show that the maximum set of permissions that can be acquired by a user in the two hierarchies is the same. The significance of using the maximum set of permissions is that within the equivalent hierarchies, the users can have the same set of accesses, even though, within each hierarchy, the users may have to activate a different set of roles. Here, we introduce the notion of acquisition-equivalence between two hierarchies. We say that two hierarchies are acquisition-equivalent if they allow the same maximum set of permissions to be acquired by a user assigned to the senior-most role. We use P max (H) to refer to the maximum set of permissions that a user can acquire through the seniormost role of the hierarchy H in a session. The notion of acquisition-equivalence is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.4 (Acquisition Equivalence or AC-Equivalence of Two Hierarchies).
Let H 1 and H 2 be two hierarchies over role set Roles. We then say that H 1 and H 2 are acquisition-equivalent or AC-equivalent (written as H 1 = AC H 2 ), if P max (H 1 ) = P max (H 2 ). Furthermore, H 1 = AC H 2 and H 2 = AC H 3 , then
The following theorem provides the formal characteristics of an ACequivalent set of hierarchies. 
THEOREM 4.4 (AC-EQUIVALENT HIERARCHIES). Let H
implies that in the linear component LH i , there is an I relation that precedes (not necessarily immediately, as LH mid may not be empty) an A relation. All hierarchies that do not have such a component are AC-equivalent to a monotype hierarchy of the same structure. As a consequence, first, the theorem implies that any two monotype hierarchies are AC-equivalent, as the condition LH mid = (LH , L x , LH mid , L y , L ) cannot occur in a monotype hierarchy. For example, consider a monotype I-hierarchy H 1 . Now construct an A-hierarchy H 2 such that it contains the same roles that are in H 1 , and for each I relation between a pair of roles in H 1 , H 2 has an A relation. The theorem indicates that H 1 = AC H 2 . This is because all the permissions that can be used by a user assigned to the senior-most role of H 1 , can also be used by a user assigned to the senior-most role of H 2 . The only difference between the two is that the users may have to activate a different set of roles from the (H)s of the two hierarchies to do that.
Furthermore, the theorem indicates that every hierarchy that does not contain a linear component shown above is AC-equivalent to a monotype hierarchy of the same structure and, hence, to each other. This is because if an I relation precedes an A-hierarchy in the hierarchy then the permissions associated with the roles below the A-hierarchy cannot be acquired by any user assigned to the senior-most role, hence, reducing the permissions that can be acquired. The significance of this result is that in systems where the principle of least privilege is not of much concern, any monotype hierarchy can be used instead of a more complex hybrid hierarchy.
DERIVED RELATIONS IN A HIERARCHY
In a hierarchy where all the three types of hierarchies can coexist, a hierarchical relation between a pair of roles that are not directly related may be derived. From the axioms and the hierarchy definitions presented in Section 3, it is easy to see that the three hierarchy types are transitive. For instance, if (x ≥ y) and ( y ≥ z) then it implies (x ≥ z). However, in a hybrid hierarchy, the derived relation between an arbitrary pair of roles can have partial transitivity or special hierarchical semantics. For instance, if (x ≥ i y) and ( y ≥ z) then it implies (x ≥ i z) i.e., transitivity exists only with respect to the permission-inheritance semantics. Similarly, assume (x ≥ a y) and ( y ≥ i z). Here it appears that x and z are not hierarchically related because (1) if a user u assigned to x activates x, he does not acquire z's permissions, and (2) u cannot activate z to acquire its permissions. Note, however, that u can activate y and acquire all the permissions that can be acquired through z. We call this special derived type a conditioned derived relation, written as (x[A](B) f y), and, defined as follows: roles in A and B ), if, for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the following holds:
where f ∈ {≥ i , ≥}, |A| > 0, |B| ≥ 0, and (b ≥ a y) is a direct relation.
Here, the condition indicates that x is related to each a ∈ A directly or through a derived A relation, whereas each a is related to y by the f relation. This implies that a permission that can be acquired through role y can be acquired by a user assigned to role x without activating y, but by activating any of the roles in A. We note that B may be empty, in which case, the conditioned derived relation is simply written as (x[A] f y). If B is not empty, then for each b ∈ B, there is an A path from x to y through b. If C = A ∩ B then, for all c ∈ C, both (c ≥ i y) and (c ≥ a y) hold and, hence, (c ≥ y). It is possible that (x[A]({x}) f y), which means (x[A] f y) holds and (x ≥ a y) is a direct relation. As we shall see, it is not necessary that each hierarchical path from x to each a ∈ A contain only A relations; it is only required that a user who is assigned to, or can activate, x can also activate a. This, however, implies that derived/direct relation between x and a is not an I-relation. Furthermore, we note that in (x[A](B) f y), f is either ≥ i or ≥.
Example 5.1. Consider the hierarchy of Figure 7 , representing a medical department. PD can be enabled for 3 hr only. SD's relation to DD and ND are as discussed in Figure 7 . N can be I-inherited by DD and ND. ED is enabled at all times. The A relation between ED and N allows a user assigned to ED to explicitly act as a nurse besides inheriting N's permissions through DD or ND. Assume that the HD role represents the head doctor of the medical department, which is enabled at all times. HD can act as the supervisor role of doctors. Two of the conditioned-derived relations are as follows.
(SD[{DD, ND}] ≥ i N):
This is because users assigned to SD can acquire permissions of N only by activating DD or ND.
(HD[{DD, ND, ED}]({ED}) ≥ i N):
This is because users assigned to HD can acquire permissions of N by activating SD, ND, or ED. Furthermore, the users can directly activate N (because of the A path through ED).
The Inference Rules
We now introduce the inference rules that allow derivation of indirect relations between roles from a set of explicitly specified hierarchical relations. Such derived relations can be used to determine the permissions that can be acquired through the activation of a role in a hierarchy by a user. We use ISen( y) = {x| (x ≥ a y) is a direct relation} to denote the set of the immediate A seniors of role y. The inference rules are as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Inference Rules).
Let H be a role hierarchy, x, y, z ∈ Roles(H), and A, A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 ⊆ Roles(H). Then the inference rules for deriving indirect relations are as shown in Table V .
R 1 is a trivial case of transitivity using a single hierarchy type. Thus, if f is ≥ a , then from the two relations (x ≥ a y) and ( y ≥ a z), relation (x ≥ a z) is derived. R 2 applies to all the pairs with direct or derived relations. This can result in a conditioned-derived relation of the form (x[A] f z). R 3 deals with each of the cases in which an unconditioned relation follows a conditionedderived relation.
In a hierarchy, there may be more than one hierarchical path between roles that are not directly related. Such a situation arises when there are multiple hierarchical paths between a given pair of roles. R 4 deals with such cases. Rule R 4.1 is a trivial case in which both the hierarchical paths are the same unconditioned relation (derived or direct). Rule R 4.2 captures all the possible combinations of two different unconditioned relations between the same pair. Similarly, rule R 4.3 captures all the possible combinations of two different hierarchical relations between the same pair of roles in which one is an unconditioned-derived relation. Last, R 4.4 captures all the possible combinations of two different hierarchical conditioned-derived relations between a pair of roles. Table VI illustrates the application of these rules to determine the derived relations for the hierarchy in Figure 7 .
Soundness and Completeness of the Inference Rules
In this section, we show that the set of inference rules introduced above is sound and complete, using the notion of authorization consistent hierarchies, which is defined below. In the definition, we use predicate can activate (u, r, H) to mean that u can activate role r in role hierarchy H. Similarly, we use predicate can be acquired (p, r, H) to mean that permission p can be acquired through role r using permission-inheritance semantics in hierarchy H. Let UAH(H) and PAH(H) be sets of all the user-role and role-permission assignments related to the roles in Roles(H). 
(Hybrid hierarchy with unconditioned relations)
(Hybrid hierarchy with one unconditioned-derived relation)
(Hierarchy with multiple paths between two roles; subscripts indicate the path number) Rule Applied Derived Relations
Definition 5.3 (Authorization-Consistent Hierarchies). Let H 1 and H 2 be two hierarchies such that Roles(H 1 ) = Roles(H 2 ), UAH (H 1 ) = UAH (H 2 ) and PAH (H 1 ) = PAH (H 2 ). Then, we say that H 1 and H 2 are authorization consistent (written as H 1 ≈ H 2 ) if, for all r ∈ Roles (H 1 ), the following conditions hold:
1. ∀u ∈ Users, can activate (u, r, H 1 ) ←→ can activate (u, r, H 2 ), 2. ∀ p ∈ Permissions, can be acquired (p, r, H 1 ) ←→ can be acquired (p, r, H 2 ).
Here, we note that the two hierarchies considered have the same set of roles, user-role assignments and role-permission assignments. Condition (1) implies that if a user u can activate a role r in Roles(H 1 ), then he can activate it even if H 1 is replaced by H 2 (and vice versa). Similarly, the second condition says that the set of permissions that can be acquired through a role under H 1 is also the same set of permissions that can be acquired through that role in H 2 for any given user. This signifies that if two hierarchies are authorization consistent then a user assigned to a role can activate exactly the same set of roles and acquire the same set of permissions under the two hierarchies. This means the permission-inheritance and role-activation semantics in the two hierarchies are the same, even if the sets of hierarchical relations in the two hierarchies are different. Figure 8 depicts an example of the notion of authorization consistency. Here, the hierarchy relation h 1 in H 2 can be inferred from the hierarchical relations (r 1 ≥ i r 3 ) and (r 3 ≥ r 5 ), whereas, h 2 can be inferred from the two hierarchical paths from role r 1 to r 4 . Hence, H 2 adds no new access capability compared to H 1 . However, h 3 in H 3 cannot be inferred from the hierarchical relations (r 1 ≥ i r 3 ) and (r 3 ≥ r 5 ). In H 3 , a user assigned to r 1 can also activate r 5 , which is not possible in H 1 or H 2 . Hence, (H 1 H 3 ), and (H 2 H 3 ). We use this notion of authorization consistency between two hierarchies to show that the set of rules presented above is sound, i.e., each new derived relation that can be deduced from a given set of hierarchical relations using the rules produces the same inheritance and activation semantics that is already present in the original hierarchy. Within a hierarchy H, we use h xz to represent (
, where x, z ∈ Roles(H) and A,B ⊆ Roles(H). The following theorem formally states this result.
THEOREM 5.1 (SOUNDNESS OF RULES R 1 -R 4 ). Given a role hierarchy H, if a new hierarchical relation h xz is derived from hierarchical relations in H as per rules R 1 -R 4 , and H = H ∪ {h xz }, then H and H are authorization consistent, i.e., H ≈ H .
The theorem implies that the new relations derived using the rules do not allow a role to inherit more (or less) permissions than was allowed to it before the derived relation is added. Similarly, the new derived relation does not allow a user to be able to activate more (or less) number of roles than that was allowed before the derived relation is introduced. Next, we present the completeness theorem for the rules R 1 -R 4 . We write H[R 1 -R 4 ] h x,z to indicate that the relations in H can logically derive relation h x,z using rules R 1 -R 4 . The theorem indicates that if a relation, say f , between any two roles, say x and z, of Roles(H) cannot be derived from the hierarchical relations in H, then any role hierarchy containing such a relation is not authorization consistent with H. In other words, we can take every pair of roles (x, z) of Roles(H) and every possible hierarchical relations between them, including conditioned derived relations and extend H by adding it to get H . If we get H ≈ H' , the theorem implies that the rules R 1 -R 4 will derive it. Hence, this shows that the rules are complete. Using the transitivity of the hierarchical relations and considering all the cases of the rules, we can easily construct the proofs. The proofs for both the theorems are provided in Appendix B. (u,r,t,H n 
can be acquired (p,r,t,H o ) ↔ can be acquired (p,r,t,H n ) C2 r C2 is not Satisfied and (s ≥ i r ≥ a j ) ∈ H n
HIERARCHY-TRANSFORMATION ALGORITHMS
In an organization, policies evolve with time, affecting the existing role hierarchies. New roles may need to be added and old ones may need to be deleted or modified. Permission sets of existing roles or their temporal properties may need to be altered. Making such changes may require restructuring the hierarchies to avoid undesirable situations.
In this section, we analyze transformations of a role hierarchy when a role is added, modified, or deleted that best maintain the permission-inheritance and role-activation semantics of the original hierarchy.
Role Addition
Typically, a new role is added to an existing hierarchy to distribute a set of new permissions among the already existing roles in the hierarchy. Before we add a new role to a hierarchy, we need to properly identify the existing sets of roles that can be its seniors and juniors based on the permission-distribution requirements. Furthermore, we need to consider the existing constraints on and/or among roles in the hierarchy to determine possible new relations between the existing roles and the new role. While preexisting hierarchical semantics may need to be maintained, the permission-acquisition and role-activation semantics of the original hierarchy may need to be relaxed to allow some desirable changes. Let r be the new role to be added in the original hierarchy H o . Suppose r is to be added between roles s and j, and (s f j ) ∈ H o . By adding the new role, assume we obtain the new hierarchy H n . That is, H n = (H o ∪ {(s f 1 r), (r f 2 j )})\(s f j ) for some hierarchy relations f 1 and f 2 .
In general, when a new role is added, we require that the original permissionacquisition and/or role-activation semantics of the hierarchy is maintained. These requirements can be represented as the conditional criteria, shown in Table VII , that should be valid after the transformation has been made.
When a new role r is added between two hierarchically related roles s and j, a crucial issue is the effect it has on the original relationship between s and j. Based on the hierarchical relations introduced between s and r and between r and j, there could be various derived relations between s and j. We introduce three criteria that capture all the possible changes in the semantics of the relationship between s and j in the new hierarchy H n compared to the relation they had in the original hierarchy H o , as shown in Table IX (see later) . Here, criterion C1 indicates that the activation-inheritance semantics is maintained between s and j after adding the new role r. In other words, C1 is said to be 
S1
No extra constraint is added with respect to the new role r;
S2
A permission-centric activation constraint is added for the new role r
S3
A user-centric activation constraint is added for the new role r; S4 (s, r) is considered to be in DSoD S5 (r, j ) is considered to be in DSoD satisfied if there is activation-inheritance semantics applied between s and j in both H o and H n (e.g., row a1 in Table IX) , or in neither H o nor H n (e.g., row b4 in Table IX ). If only one of H o and H n , has the activation-inheritance semantics between s and j (e.g., row a4 and b1 in Table IX) , then C1 is not satisfied. Similarly, C2 guarantees that the permission-inheritance semantics is maintained between s and j after adding the new role. That is, C2 is satisfied if there is permission-inheritance semantics between s and j in both H o and H n (e.g., row b4 in Table IX) , or in neither H o nor H n (e.g., row a1 in Table IX) . If, however, only one of H o and H n has the permission-inheritance semantics between the two roles s and j (e.g., row a4 and b1 in Table IX) , then C2 is not satisfied. If C2 is not satisfied, it doesn't necessarily mean that the permission-inheritance semantics is completely lost. For instance, a conditioned-derived relation could exist between s and j after the new role has been added. Criterion C2 r captures such cases. Note that because one of the three hierarchy relations exist between s and j in H o , a user assigned to s can always acquire the permissions of j in H o -through the use of either the inheritance or the activation semantics. One special case is when in H n , we have s ≥ i r and r ≥ a j (e.g., row a5, b5, and c5 in Table IX) , where the original relation between s and j will be completely lost.
When a new role is added, various new constraints related to the new role may need to be added as well. We consider the five scenarios (S1 through S5), shown in Table VIII to capture such new constraints associated with r. Whether or not we can allow these constraints to be specified on the new role r depends on the hierarchical relation that r has with s and/or j in H n , as shown in the right part of Table IX . Here, √ means the corresponding constraint can be introduced for r and × means that the corresponding constraint cannot be supported for r. S1 indicates a scenario where no extra constraint is added. If we want to add a permission-centric activation constraint to r (S2), we require that s≥ a r ∈ H n [Joshi et al. 2002] ; if we want to add a user-centric activation constraint to r (S3), we require that s ≥ i r ∈ H n or s ≥ r ∈ H n [Joshi et al. 2002] . Note that DSoD constraints can be defined among roles related by A-hierarchy [Joshi et al. 2002] . Thus, S4 is applicable if s ≥ a r ∈ H n and S5 is supported if r ≥ a j ∈ H n .
Role Deletion
When a role is deleted from a hierarchy, the crucial issue is what to do with the permissions associated with it and the users assigned to it. Generally, it will be required that the permissions be retained in the system and make them available through other roles in the hierarchy. This requires redistributing the 
IA-hierarchy (≥) for any h h h
assigned to the roles in the hierarchy. The third approach is ad-hoc in nature and inefficient as permissions are explicitly assigned to all senior roles through which they could be acquired before the transformation. Hence, it defeats the purpose of a hierarchy structure. In practice, this approach may be applicable when the whole hierarchy needs to be restructured. We do not discuss the third approach further. As before, let H o be the original hierarchy and H n the new hierarchy obtained by deleting role r. Furthermore, let U r and P r be the sets of users and permissions explicitly assigned to role r. For each immediate junior j of r, let U j be the set of users assigned to j. Let s be an immediate senior of r. Table X depicts what permissions users assigned to r in H o can now acquire in H n .
As shown in the table, for both approaches, it is possible that the users are reassigned to senior or the junior roles. Privilege escalation of users in U r occurs in the first approach if they are reassigned to senior roles; privilege depletion occurs if the users in U r are reassigned to the junior roles. In practice, a choice can be made based on the risk factor related to the privilege escalation and privilege depletion resulting from reassignment of U r . Note that U s and U j are not affected in this case. In the second approach, if the users in U r are reassigned to s, privilege escalation, similar to that in the first approach, occurs with respect to U r . In the second approach, privilege escalation also occurs with respect to the users in U j . Table XI further depicts different cases of transformations for the first and the second approaches that attempt to meet the criteria C1 and C2 introduced earlier (Note here the conditions are checked for all r ∈ H n not for r ∈ H n as indicated in the Table VII) . Figure 9 depicts various transformations when (r≥ a j) ∈ H o under the first approach. Note that s may be related to its immediate senior by any of the three hierarchical relations. To show the overall picture, we include roles x, y, and z as seniors of s with respect to I, A, and IA relations, respectively. Let h be the original relation between s and r. When h is an I-hierarchy, s and j are not hierarchically related, as s does not inherit j's permissions, neither is any user assigned to s or its seniors able to activate j in H o . Hence, case (i) in Figure 9a (i.e., " no relation" between s and j) retains the original derived relation between s and j (as indicated in the table). The choices (ii), (iii), and (iv) in Figure 9a result in undesirable situations as each one makes something possible that was not originally possible. Similarly, when h is an A or IA-hierarchy, s and j have a derived relation (s≥ a j). Hence, as shown in Figures 9b and c , after the deletion of role r, we can introduce the direct relation s ≥ a j. We note that after the deletion of role r, if we have (s ≥ j), it makes the inheritance of j's permissions by s possible, which was not originally allowed.
The cases for (r ≥ i j) or (r ≥ j) in H o can be similarly explained. When (r ≥ i j) ∈ H o , for all relations between s and r, the resulting relation between s and j will be (s ≥ i j) as shown in the table. It is straightforward to see that it is so when h is an I-relation. If h is an IA-relation, then (s ≥ i j) is the derived relation in H o and, hence, after the transformation, the relation is maintained. However, if h is an A relation, then the original relation between s and j would be (s[{r}] ≥ i j). If in the transformed hierarchy, we use relation (s ≥ i j) then users who can activate s cannot activate j, but still can acquire j's permission by activating s in place of the deleted role r. Hence, the semantics about a user not being able to activate it but being able to acquire its permissions by activating some senior role is still present in the hierarchy with the new relation (s ≥ i j). It is, however, to be noted that this transformation affects the original relations between j and role s or those above it. The change is in terms of what needs to be activated to acquire j's permissions. Various cases for the second approach can be similarly explained. The key difference is when (r ≥ a j) ∈ H o . Here, if (s ≥ i r) ∈ H o , no hierarchical relation between s and j can be derived in H o ; hence, we cannot have any relation between s and j. However, no relation between s and j means that the permission set P r , now assigned to j, cannot be used by any user who can activate s. Note that in H o , a user who is assigned to s can inherit permissions of r and hence acquire P r . Therefore, for this case, there is no appropriate transformation. Similarly, if (s ≥ r) ∈ H o , the only possible new relation is (s≥ a j). However, it is somewhat restrictive in the sense that, in H o , a user u who can activate s need not explicitly activate r to acquire its permissions, but in H n , u needs to activate j to acquire its permissions.
Partitioning of an Existing Role
Sometimes, it is essential that an existing role be simply partitioned to change the semantics of the hierarchy. In particular, partitioning may indicate the requirement for separating the role's permissions into different subsets. We identify the following three ways to partition a role: (1) vertical partitioning: here a role is partitioned into a set of new roles that form a linear path with the permission set of the old role distributed among the new roles; (2) horizontal partitioning: here the role's permission set is partitioned into a number of disjoint sets, each of which is assigned to a new role; the new roles do not have any hierarchical relations between them; and (3) hybrid partitioning: here both vertical and horizontal partitioning are applied on the role, which result in an arbitrary hierarchy over the new roles. Figure 10 illustrates these partitions.
In each case, the set of new roles replaces the partitioned role in the hierarchy. Once a role is partitioned, it is possible that an administrator completely redefines the hierarchical relationships in the part of the hierarchy above the partitioned role. Such a case requires offline redesign of the system. However, it may be necessary to retain the original hierarchical semantics as defined by criteria C1 and C2 (Table VII) . Table XII lays out various transformation characteristics of the three approaches with emphasis in retaining the original derived relation between s and j. In particular, Table XII depicts cases where vertical partitioning creates a monotype linear path and hybrid partitioning creates multiple monotype linear paths. We discuss hybrid linear paths resulting from vertical and hybrid partitioning at the end of this section. Here, role r of the original hierarchy H o is partitioned into a set of new roles RP = {x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n }. As usual, let s and j represent a senior and a junior of r.
Row 1 shows various hierarchy characteristics associated with the roles in RP. As already indicated above, in vertical partitioning, the new roles form a linear path. As shown in the table, if originally (s ≥ i r), (r f j) ∈ H o where f ∈ {≥ i , ≥}, or (s ≥ r), (r ≥ i j ) ∈ H o , then in the new hierarchy H n , the monotype hierarchy over the roles in RP should be of type ≥ i or ≥. This is necessary to retain the original derived relation (s ≥ i j) in the transformed hierarchy. If (s≥r), (r≥j) ∈ H o or (s ≥ r), (r ≥ a j ) ∈ H o , then the new linear path over the roles in RP should be of type ≥. Similarly, if (s ≥ a r), (r f j ) ∈ H o , then the new linear path over the roles in RP should be of type ≥ a or ≥.
The original semantics as defined by criteria C1 and C2 are ensured in the vertical partitioning by these transformations and by the new relations defined in rows 3 and 4. For horizontal partitioning, the roles in RP are not hierarchically related. For hybrid partitioning, the roles in RP form multiple linear paths. The condition for the hybrid partitioning states that at least one linear path must allow inferring the derived relation (s f j ) of H n . For the linear path that maintains the original derived relation (s f j ), we can use the transformations outlined for vertical partitioning in the if-then columns.
Entries in row 2 indicate the reassignments of the users in U r originally assigned to role r, to new role(s) in RP. The reassignments shown here are defined on the basis that the original access capabilities of the users are to be retained, although they may result in privilege escalation for some users. In practice, this may not be the actual case and the relations among roles in the partition shown in row 1 may need to be accordingly adjusted. Rows 3 and 4 indicate how the roles s and j are related to the new roles in the partition. For a vertical partitioning approach, the original relation between s and j is used between s and x 1 , and x n and j, as indicated. Note that x 1 and x n are the seniorand the junior-most roles of the new linear path created by the roles in RP. In case of horizontal partitioning, s and j are made senior and junior of each of the roles in RP. The case for hybrid partitioning is similar to that of the horizontal partitioning except that the role s is made senior to the senior-most roles of each of the linear paths formed over the roles in RP, whereas j is made the junior of each of junior-most roles of these linear paths.
Thus far, we have considered monotype linear components during the vertical and the hybrid partition. In general, the vertical and hybrid partitioning may result in hybrid linear path components. In such a case, the users originally assigned to the partitioned role need to be assigned to the role set from the partitioned set. First, consider the vertical partitioning. Here, the original users of the partitioned role is assigned to the maximal subset of the partition set, say MR, such that the roles in MR do not belong to any elements of the (H) 
No pair is which is not a linear path) such where
of the senior-most role. In the case of the hybrid hierarchy, the original users are assigned to the set of roles that represents union of the MPs of individual elements of the complete LPDHH. As indicated above, the need for such partitioning is primarily to restructure or redistribute permission sets in a hierarchy. Another reason for doing such partitioning may be because of the temporal properties. For example, a role may need to be vertically partitioned to arrange the temporal properties in such a way that the intervals associated with a senior role contain the intervals associated with the junior roles. Similarly, a horizontal partition may need to be done to create roles with distinct nonoverlapping intervals. Furthermore, a hybrid partitioning may be needed to properly structure very complex temporal properties. Analysis of such partitioning, based on temporal properties, has been considered in detail in a slightly different context in Joshi et al. [2005a] and also details the pros and cons of such partitioning and provides design guidelines.
Edge Deletion and Insertion
GTRBAC allows events of type (enable/disable h), which essentially adds or removes the hierarchical edge between a prespecified pair of role. Using this event, periodicity and duration constraints on hierarchical relation can be expressed. Hence, edge deletion and insertion issues can be considered as related to the design of the time-based RBAC policies that includes hierarchical relations. In a generic nontemporal RBAC framework with hybrid hierarchy, edge deletion, and insertion are important operations. However, both these operations can be viewed as operations on role addition and deletion discussed above. For instance, an edge deletion can be viewed as the deletion of the junior role of the edge and the addition of the same role with all the edges other than the deleted edge reinserted by considering the issues addressed earlier for role deletion. Similarly, an edge insertion can be viewed as role addition operation(s), if either or both of the roles in the edge did not exist in the original hierarchy. Alternatively, if both the roles of the edges are present in the hierarchy, then edge addition can be viewed as removing the junior role of the edge and reinserting it with all its original hierarchical relations as well as the new relation.
RELATED WORK
Several researchers have addressed issues related to inheritance semantics in RBAC [Giuri 1995 [Giuri , 1996 Moffett 1998; Nyanchama and Osborn 1999; Sandhu 1996 Sandhu , 1998 ] Our earlier work has addressed issues concerning the inheritance relation when temporal properties are introduced [Joshi et al. 2002] . Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no work has been reported in the literature that thoroughly analyzes the coexistence of different types of hierarchical relations on a set of roles. In Joshi et al. [2002 Joshi et al. [ , 2005b , we use the separate notion of hierarchy using permission-usage and role-activation semantics similar to the one proposed by Sandhu [1998] and strengthen Sandhu's argument that the distinction between the two semantics is very crucial. This argument is based on the fact that the simple usage semantics is inadequate for expressing desired inheritance relation when certain dynamic SoD constraints are used between two roles that are hierarchically related, whereas, we emphasize the need for such distinction to capture the inheritance semantics in the presence of various temporal constraints. Sandhu's notion of activation hierarchy extending the inheritance hierarchy corresponds to the IA-hierarchy and our A-hierarchy corresponds to Sandhu's relation that relates two roles by activation hierarchy, but not by inheritance semantics [Sandhu 1998 ]. Giuri [1995 Giuri [ , 1996 has proposed an activation hierarchy based on AND and OR roles. However, these AND-OR roles can be easily simulated within Sandhu's ER-RBAC96 model that uses usage and activation hierarchies, making Giuri's model a special case of ER-RBAC96 [Sandhu 1998 ]. In order to address the needs of control principles in an organization, which include separation of duty, decentralization, and supervision and review, Moffet [1998] and Moffett and Lupu [1999] have identified three types of hierarchies: is a hierarchy activity hierarchy, and supervision hierarchies. They show that for addressing more completely these control principles, we need a dynamic access-control model and a hierarchy that allows restrictive inheritance as well as dynamic propagation of access rights [Moffett and Lupu 1999] . We believe that GTRBAC's temporal constraint framework with trigger and constraint-enabling mechanisms and temporal hierarchies can provide the modeling capabilities to address such dynamic issues. Nyanchama et al. address the transformation of hierarchies in terms of addition, deletion, and partitioning of roles in the context of access rights administration [Nyanchama and Osborn 1994] . However, the analysis is limited to monotype hierarchies and does not indicate how the transformations are affected by the presence of other constraints on hierarchical roles. Sandhu et al. [1999] have presented ARBAC97 model for administrating RBAC policies using structural properties of RBAC96 hierarchy. Similarly, in Crampton et al. [2003] have proposed a Scoped Administration of RBAC (SARBAC) using the notion of an administration scope as a unit of administration to impose conditions on hierarchy operations. The aim of both the models has been to define administrative control by defining range or scope of control for the administration of roles and hierarchical relations. By using the flexible transformation primitives presented in Section 6, the development of a more complete RBAC administration model than the ARBAC97 and SARBAC models is possible and is left as a future work. Note that although both AR-BAC97 and SARBAC emphasize hierarchy management, they do not consider the coexistence of SoD constraints and role hierarchies and applies to monotype hierarchies only. Furthermore, role partitioning is a hierarchy transformation primitive that has not been addressed in the literature before.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented an extensive analysis of hybrid temporal role hierarchies for GTRBAC model. We have introduced the notion of uniquely activable set of a hierarchy that identifies access capabilities of a user assigned to a role in a hierarchy in a single session. The formal results we have presented allows determining uniquely activable sets for hybrid temporal role hierarchies and provide a basis for controlling privilege distribution to the users by restricting activable sets associated with the roles they are assigned to. The results related to the AC-equivalence between different role hierarchies also show that, in cases where the principle of least privilege is not a concern, a monotype hierarchy may be used. Furthermore, as an A-hierarchy does not allow direct permission inheritance, the results show that the A-hierarchy provides the most needed flexibility. In particular, an A-hierarchy allows DSoD constraints to be defined on hierarchically related roles. Furthermore, the inherit-all-permission semantics of I-hierarchy, as well as IA-hierarchy, has several pitfalls in terms of their ability to handle many organizational control principles [Moffett 1998 ]. We have also introduced a set of inference rules, which can be employed to infer hierarchical relationships between pairs of roles that are not directly related. We have formally showed that the set of inference rules is sound and complete. In a complex hybrid hierarchy, these rules provide a formal basis for analyzing the permission-acquisition and role-activation semantics. We have also introduced the notion of conditioned-derived relation that augments the three hierarchies (I, A, and IA hierarchies) and facilitates capturing much fine-grained derived permission-acquisition and activation semantics within a hierarchy. We have also addressed the issue of hierarchy transformation with respect to role addition, deletion and partitioning. These transformations essentially form the basis for policy evolution in an organization. It is to be noted that transformations that retain original hierarchical semantics in a hybrid hierarchy need to be based on what type of additional role constraints exist or will be added in the hierarchy. The results presented in this paper provide a formal basis for developing administrative tools for the management of GTRBAC systems. Such security administrative functions are crucial for a well-planned, timely control of unauthorized accesses, as well as for distributing least access capabilities to users in order to allow them to carry out their activities and, at the same time, minimize damage that may be caused by misuse of privileges. We plan to extend the present work in various directions. We also plan to develop an SQL-like language for specifying temporal properties for roles and to develop a prototype of such language on top of a relational DBMS. Using the results presented here, we plan to develop efficient security administration and management tools.
APPENDIX A
The proofs are included in the technical report version of this paper, which is available as a CERIAS technical report at https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/ with the same title.
B
antichain set and the set of roles that the user assigned to S H can activate. The difference between this approach and the one presented in Section 4 is that the latter computes (H) of the entire hierarchy incrementally from that of the subhierarchies, while the approach described above operates on the entire hierarchy. The approach described in Section 4, hence, facilitates the maintenance of the (H) of the hierarchy incrementally. That is, a tool can be easily designed to compute and maintain the (H) information for any subhierarchy and use that to reconstruct the (H) of the entire hierarchy. The (H) information for each role in the hierarchy is needed in order to support the authorization decision process. This would not be easy using the approach described here. Furthermore, the computation of the antichain set for a general I-hierarchy itself is not a straightforward task. The approach in Section 4 essentially provides one incremental way to compute the antichains that form the (H) of the given hierarchy.
